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IV 
INTRODUCTION 
Respondents Babcock et al. ("Payette Lake Lessees" or "Lessees") and Priest Lake State 
Lessees Association, Inc. ("Priest Lake Association" or "Association") agree with the Attorney 
General that the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-310A turns on the meaning of the term 
"disposal" in Article IX, Section 8. Like the district court, however, they limit the term 
"disposals" to a "fee" interest being transferred and, therefore, to the sale of endowment land. 
While their underlying analyses parallel the Attorney General's examination of the term's plain 
meaning, relevant decisional authority and the 1890 Constitutional Convention's debates, they 
reach diametrically opposed construction of the term "disposa1."l 
At its core, the construction of "disposal" advanced by the Lessees and the Association 
takes as its source what they characterize as its dictionary meaning. The Lessees, for example, 
criticize the Attorney General for "provid[ing] this Court with a convoluted textual analysis of 
Article IX, Section 8" e., "[r ] ather than accept the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of 
'disposal,' the Attorney General[] textually analyzes Article IX, Section 8, sentence by sentence, 
and comes to numerous strained conclusions." Cross-Appellants' Response Brief ("Payette Lake 
1 The Priest Lake Association raises two additional issues. First, it disputes the Attorney 
General's standing to challenge § 58-310A because, in its view, the beneficiaries of income from 
the cottage site endowment lands have suffered no injury-in-fact from the statute's 
implementation. The Association did not raise this issue before the district court. However, 
given its jurisdictional character, the Attorney General discusses his standing to maintain the 
present action at the outset of the Reply Argument. Second, the Association argues that the 
legislative findings are severable from the substantive provisions of § 58-31 OA but does not 
suggest what legal effect those findings have once isolated from any legally enforceable duty. 
Given the insubstantiality of the Association's argument, the Attorney General does not believe 
further discussion of the issue is warranted and rests upon the severability analysis in his opening 
brief at pages 34 through 36. 
1 
Br.") at 12. In so arguing, they ignore the critical, indeed dispositive, role that context plays in 
understanding the Framer's careful use of the terms "sale," "rental," "disposition" and 
"disposal." Respondents' treatment of the seven opinions over the last century that address the 
term and the related public auction requirement is, at best, superficial and, with respect to the 
East Side Blaine County 2 and the Idaho Watersheds Project ("IWP") 3 decisions, plainly 
inconsistent with both the language and the logic used by this Court. 
The Lessees and the Association choose not to address the Attorney General's close 
attention to the Constitutional Convention's debates that attended formulation of Article IX, 
Section 8 and shed specific light on the Framer's choice of the term "disposal." See, e.g., Payette 
Lake Br. at 23 ("[t]he Attorney General's arguments regarding Idaho's constitutional convention 
debates fixates on a set of successful and unsuccessful amendments to Article IX, Section 8"). 
The Lessees instead draw the quite odd conclusion from the debates that the Framers expressed 
an "intent to protect endowment lands through private trust law" (id. at 21), while the 
Association relies on the views of Delegates Claggett and Gray to stand for the proposition that 
Article IX, Section 8 give the legislature a "key role in determining the management and 
disposition of the endowment lands so long as it did not interfere with the Board of Land 
Commissioner's [sic] charge of obtaining maximum return" (Respondent Priest Lake Lessees 
Association, Inc.'s Reply Brief ("Priest Lake Br.") at 25. The flaw in their analysis lies in 
2 East Side Blaine County Live Stock Ass 'n v. State Board, 34 Idaho 807, 198 P. 760 (1921). 
3 IWP v. State Board, 128 Idaho 761, 918 P.2d 1206 (1996) ("IWP I"); IWP v. State Board, 
133 Idaho 55, 982 P.2d 358 (1999) ("IWP II"); IWP v. State Board, 133 Idaho 64,982 P.2d 367 
(1999) ("IWP III"); IWP v. State Board, 133 Idaho 68, 982 P.2d 371 (1999) ("IWP IV"). 
2 
ignoring the explicit restrictions on the Legislature'S powers in Article IX, Section 8--one of 
which is "disposal at public auction." The Lessees' and Association's failure to focus, as the 
Attorney General did, on the Convention's deliberations over the third and fourth sentences of 
Article IX, Section 8 is fatal to their position. Respondents, in sum, fail in their effort to salvage 
a statute that plainly conflicts with Article IX, Section 8 whether judged by its text, decisional 
construction, or Constitutional Convention deliberations.4 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS STANDING TO SEEK A DETERMINATION 
OF § 58-310A'S CONSTITUTIONALITY 
A. The Priest Lake Association disputes the Attorney General's standing to initiate 
the action below because "[t]here is simply not one shred of evidence that Idaho Code § 58-31 OA 
has resulted in any actual pecuniary or other loss, or even speculative loss, to the endowment 
beneficiaries." Priest Lake Br. at 6. It adds that, aside from the "complete absence of evidence 
of an existing or prospective injury, there is not even an allegation of a causal relationship to 
Idaho Code § 58-310A of such injury." Id. at 8. The Association thus suggests that the Attorney 
General could raise a justiciable controversy only by establishing that the income generated by 
implementation of an otherwise unconstitutional statute has been, and will be, less than the 
cottage sites have been leased in accordance with the conflict auction requirements in § 58-310. 
4 The Association's brief contains factual narrative and relies upon a document that is not 
reflected in the district court record. See Priest Lake Br. at 2 (describing nature of the "Priest 
Lake community" and "Priest Lake families"); id., Appendix C (Feb. 9, 1990 minutes of Sen. 
Res. and Env't Comm.). The narrative and the documents have no place in this appeal. 
Procedural considerations aside, neither the nature of the Priest Lake community nor the 
committee minutes are germane to resolving the question of § 58-31 OA' s constitutionality. 
3 
The Payette Lake Lessees prudently have not raised a similar claim. 
This Court has adopted the standing requirements applied by the United States Supreme 
Court under Article III of the federal constitution. As it explained in Van Valkenburgh v. 
Citizens/or Term Limits, l35 Idaho 121, 15 P.3d 1129 (2000): 
It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a 
court's jurisdiction must have standing .... This Court has previously stated, "[t]he 
doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party 
wishes to have adjudicated." .... In order to satisfy the case or controversy requirement 
of standing, a litigant must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial 
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." 
l35 Idaho at 124, 15 P.3d at 1132 (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 
P.2d 757, 763 (1989»; see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) ("[t]o 
seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering "injury in fact" 
that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be 
likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury"). Here, as explained 
below, the Attorney General has challenged § 58-310A on behalf of the beneficiaries of the 
income from the endowment lands that encompass the various cottage sites pursuant to his 
statutory authority under Idaho Code § 67-1401 (5) and his constitutional status as a member of 
the State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board" or "Board") under Article IX, Section 7. 
B. Section 67-1401(5) directs the Attorney General "[t]o supervise nonprofit 
corporations, corporations, charitable or benevolent societies, person or persons holding property 
subject to any public or charitable trust and to enforce whenever necessary any noncompliance or 
4 
departure from the general purpose of such trust" and to "institute, in the name of the state, any 
proceeding necessary to enforce compliance with the terms of the trust or any departure 
therefrom." The Attorney General's discrete status as a Land Board member has long been 
established. Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, 577, 107 P. 493,496 (1910) ("The individuals 
who compose the board and discharge its duties happen to be state officers, and it so happens 
that the Governor of the state by reason of being Governor is chairman of the board. \\'hen 
acting and voting at a meeting of the State Board of Land Commissioners, and discharging the 
particular and special duties devolving upon the board, he is not acting as the chief executive, but 
on the contrary is acting as one of four members of a board in the discharge of certain ministerial 
and quasi judicial duties imposed on such board by the Constitution and statutes."). 
The Attorney General sued here on behalf of the cottage site-income beneficiaries to 
obtain the benefit of the constitutional bargain struck at the 1889 Constitutional Convention with 
regard to the "disposal" of endowment lands through public auction and in his capacity as a Land 
Board commissioner to eliminate an unconstitutional restraint on discharge of those duties 
imposed on the Board under Article IX, Section 8. See Wasden ex reI. State v. Idaho State Bd of 
Land Comm'rs, 150 Idaho 547, 558, 249 P.3d 346, 357 n.l0 (2010) (Burdick, J., dissenting) 
(" Wasden ex reI. State") ("I.e. § 58-31 OA is clearly unconstitutional as-in eliminating the 
conflict auction procedure and instead requiring 'market rent'-the legislature encroached upon 
the discretion constitutionally granted to the Land Board"). The conclusion that an Idaho 
statewide officer may seek invalidation of statutes interfering with the exercise of the officer's 
constitutional-conferred authority is firmly established. Williams v. State Legislature, 111 Idaho 
5 
156, 157, 722 P.2d 465, 466 (1986) ("[t]he Legislature may not prevent a constitutional officer 
from performing his constitutional duties"); Wright v. Callahan, 61 Idaho 167, 181,99 P.2d 961, 
966 (1940) ("the legislature could not, therefore, divest [the state auditor] thereof by creating the 
office of comptroller and vesting in the comptroller the powers and duties which the Constitution 
already affixed to the auditor's office"); Balderston, 17 Idaho at 579, 107 P. at 496 ("the 
Legislature cannot authorize the land board, or anyone else, to do any act with reference to state 
lands that is forbidden by the Constitution[,]" and, as a consequence, "[a]ny gift of school or 
other state lands, or relinquishment of the state's title, is in violation of the fundamental laws of 
the state, and would be void"); cf Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 
573, 585, 850 P.2d 724, 736 (1993) ("Like the school districts, the superintendents have alleged 
they cannot provide a thorough education to their charges due to lack of state funding. Thus they 
have individual standing under Miles. "). 
N either vindicating the constitutional bargain nor eliminating the unconstitutional 
restraint on Land Board Commissioner authority turns on whether the actual implementation of 
§ 58-31 OA has resulted or is likely to result in income less than the income that would have been 
derived from adhering to the public auction mandate. The injury-in-fact instead is the statute's 
constitutional infirmity itself, and the Attorney General does not understand the Association to 
suggest that an invalidation of § 58-31 OA will not redress this injury. Because the Association 
misidentifies the injury-in-fact upon which the Attorney General predicates his suit, its challenge 
has no legs to stand on. 
e. Beyond that fundamental flaw, however, the Association's claim that no injury-
6 
in-fact exists fails even on its own tenns for two reasons. As a threshold matter, it is undisputed 
that application of § 58-310A has resulted in below-market rate rental income. This Court has 
explained why: 
The Board has long allowed the Lessees to sell or assign their leasehold interests to 
others for profit .... This proposition has also been recognized by IDL and its fonner 
and current directors, fonner and current members of the Board, and professional 
appraisers. Leasehold values are detennined by subtracting the value of improvements 
and personal property from the total sales price. [-uJ As leasehold values grew it became 
clear to the Board that it was not achieving market rent, and in 1981 the Board invented 
the concept of "premium rent" to try to decrease the amount of profit the Lessees were 
reaping from the gap between actual and market rent. The tenn "premium rent" is a 
misnomer; it would be more accurate to refer to this mechanism as a "leasehold transfer 
fee." Premium rent requires that the lessee pay the State a certain percentage of the 
value that the lessee receives from selling his leasehold interest in a cottage site. . . . 
Premium rent was conceived of as a temporary measure, the utility and impact of which 
would disappear as rents reached fair market value. In fact the IDAP A provision 
establishing premium rent ... expired on December 31, 1992. Nevertheless the Board 
and IDL have continued to apply premium rent to leasehold sales. [fl In 1986, a study 
by IDL showed that the State was receiving a rate of return on the cottage sites of 
approximately .67% per year. In an attempt to increase the return for the Beneficiaries 
the Board abandoned the flat rental rates and instead adopted a rental rate target at 2.5% 
of each cottage site's appraised value, to be phased in (incrementally increased) over a 
ten-year period. 
Wasden ex reI. State, 150 Idaho at 549, 249 P.3d at 348 (citations and footnote omitted); see also 
id. at 357,249 P.3d at 558 (Burdick, J., dissenting) ("[b]y including a premium rent provision in 
the cottage leases the Board is implicitly recognizing that it will not be achieving market rent"). 
The Association's injury-in-fact theory also misapprehends the purpose of an auction-
which is to give competing applicants the opportunity to bid on a particular cottage site lease 
containing a rental rate deemed by the State Board to maximize long-tenn financial return to the 
beneficiaries. So understood, a public auction can never result in less income than an auction-
7 
less process; rather, the auction is designed to produce a "premium" in the form of the successful 
bid amount-as will be the outcome if the cottages sites' exclusion from the ordinary conflict 
auction process is invalidated. See Idaho Code § 58-310(1) ("[w]hen two (2) or more persons 
apply to lease the same land, the director of the department of lands, or his agent, shall, at a 
stated time, and at such place as he may designate, auction off and lease the land to the applicant 
who will pay the highest premium bid therefor, the annual rental to be established by the state 
board of land commissioners,,).5 Accepting the Association's position would require employing 
5 This Court's opinion in Pike v. State Board, 19 Idaho 268, 113 P. 447 (1911), illustrates the 
nature of what is being auctioned-i.e., the lease itself-and how the auction process will 
generate revenue over and above the lease rate itself: 
Some reference has been made to the resolution which the board passed 
requiring certain concessions of the Potlatch Lumber Company in the event it should be 
the highest bidder, and also of the terms of the agreement the board required the agent 
of the company to enter into before it would order the property sold. This resolution 
would appear to be clearly in the interest of the state, and it was eminently proper for 
the board to require the company to enter into a contract agreeing to pay the appraised 
value of the land before it went to the trouble and expense of advertising the land for 
sale .... An applicant to purchase is required to enter into an agreement to bid as much 
as the minimum price before the government will advertise the land for sale. That is 
just what has been done in this case by the State Land Board. In the event the Potlatch 
Lumber Company is the highest bidder, it will, in addition to the price it is required to 
pay for this land, be obliged to make the concessions and relinquishments specified in 
the resolution of the board and the agreement filed by the company's agent. The 
company in order to secure these lands must not only be the highest bidder but must 
also give the additional value of these concessions in order to get the land. These 
conditions and concessions will tend to increase the price per acre bid by the company 
for this land instead of decrease it. 
19 Idaho at 288-89, 113 P. at 454. The very fact that the Payette Lake Lessees and the 
Association have opposed the Attorney General's position with respect to the constitutionality of 
§ 58-310A reflects their conclusion that compliance with the public auction requirement would 
affect their economic interests adversely; i. e., they fear that if the cottage site leases were subject 
to periodic auction, they would be forced to pay a premium in addition to rental rate specified in 
the auctioned lease to obtain it. 
8 
the auction process itself as the mechanism to detennine the rental rate. The Attorney General's 
standing to maintain this action, in sum, is evident regardless of the perspective from which the 
issue is examined. 
II. THE TERM "DISPOSAL" IN ARTICLE IX, SECTION 8 MUST BE 
CONSTRUED WITH REFERENCE TO ITS PARTICULAR CONTEXT AND, 
WHEN SO EXAMINED, HAS A MEANING ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH 
THE DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS ADVANCED BY THE PAYETTE LAKE 
LESSEES 
The Payette Lake Lessees contend that "[t]he Framers of our constitution must be 
understood to have employed words in the natural and ordinary sense, and to have intended what 
they have said." Payette Lake Bf. at 10. They then point to late twentieth century dictionaries 
that define the word "disposal" as encompassing "'the sale, pledge, giving away, use 
consumption or any other disposition of a thing" (id. at 11 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 471 
(6th ed. 1990)) or "'[t]o deal with conclusively,' '[t]o transfer or part with, as by giving or 
selling,' and '[t]o get rid of''' (id. (quoting Webster's II New College Dictionary 329 (1995)). 
These definitions, however, add little or nothing to the proper construction of the tenn "disposal" 
in Article IX, Section 8 for two obvious reasons. First, the Lessees isolate the tenn from its 
overall context in the constitutional provision, and, second, they fail to acknowledge that a lease 
does "dispose" of a valuable real property interest that Article IX, Section 8 read in its entirety 
seeks to protect: the right to possession of the particular cottage-site lot. 
A. "[O]ne must consider [a tenn] in its constitutional context" to understand its 
"meaning." Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State Legislature, 142 Idaho 640, 647, 132 P.3d 397, 404 
(2006) (J. Jones, 1., dissenting). The United States Supreme Court often has emphasized the 
9 
need to construe statutory or, by necessary inference, constitutional terms with careful regard to 
their particular context. Quite recently in McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218 (2011), it 
applied this principle in construing the clause "a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or 
more is prescribed by law" in the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.c. § 
924( e )(2)(A)(ii), when deciding whether a prior state drug-trafficking conviction counted as a 
"serious drug offense" for sentencing-enhancement purposes. It began its substantive analysis 
with the observation that "[a]s in all statutory construction cases, we begin with 'the language 
itself [and] the specific context in which that language is used. '" Id. at 2221 (quoting Robinson 
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,341 (1997». The Court deemed "[t]he plain text of the ACCA" to 
"require[] a federal sentencing court to consult the maximum sentence applieable to defendant's 
previous drug offense at the time of the conviction for that offense." Id. at 2221-22. It rejected 
the defendant's counter-argument-which relied on the use of the present tense "is"-that 
"maximum term" should be determined with reference to the maximum term possible under the 
convicting State's law at the time of federal court sentencing: 
That argument overlooks the fact that ACCA is concerned with convictions that have 
already occurred. Whether the prior conviction was for an offense "involving 
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a 
controlled substance" can only be answered by reference to the law under which the 
defendant was convicted. Likewise, the maximum sentence that "is prescribed by law" 
for that offense must also be determined according to the law applicable at that time. 
Id. at 2222; see also United States v. Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007,2012 (2011) ("terms must be 
read in their statutory context in order to determine how the provision in question should be 
applied in an individual case"); FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1183 (2011) ("[r]egardless 
10 
of whether 'personal' can carry a special meaning in legal usage, 'when interpreting a statute ... 
we construe language ... in light of the terms surrounding if"); Graham County Soil and Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rei. Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2010) ("we need to 
evaluate 'administrative' within the larger scheme of the public disclosure bar" because "[b]oth 
parties acknowledge, as they must, that '[s]tatutory language has meaning only in context'''). 
Here, the term "disposal" appears in a constitutional provision devoted to regulating the 
"sale or rental" of lands "granted to or acquired by the state from the general government." The 
provision contains certain requirements specific to sales-i.e., mandating the Legislature to 
"provide for the sale of said lands from time to time and for the sale of timber on all state lands" 
but limiting the authority to sell lands to 1 00 sections mlliually "in subsections of not to exceed 
three hundred and twenty acres of land to anyone individual, company or corporation." 
[Emphasis added.] Other provisions, however, are not specific to sales-i.e., prohibiting the 
post-survey "sale[] or other disposition" of public lands to "persons who may have settled on 
such ... lands" where the amount derived is directly or indirectly diminished and requiring all 
"general grants of land made by congress ... [to] be judiciously located and carefully preserved 
and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective 
object for which said grants ofland were made." [Emphasis added.] 
Taken in context, therefore, the terms "disposition" and "disposal" logically encompass, 
at the least, the one other form of income-generating activity specifically authorized in the 
provision: rentals. Indeed, neither the Payette Lake Lessees nor the Priest Lake Association 
suggests that the term "disposition" in Article IX, Section 8's second sentence does not include 
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rentals.6 The ultimate conclusion from construing "disposal" in pari materia with the remainder 
of Article IX, Section 8 is plain: The term includes endowment land transfers in addition to the 
transfer of "the entire fee" (Payette Lake Br. at 13), and, given the constitutional provision's 
animating objective of protecting endowment lands and maximizing long term income from 
them, per force extends to their rental. 7 
6 The Lessees are silent on the meaning of "other disposition." This silence is revealing, since 
the word "disposition" is defined, for presently relevant purposes, in Black's as "[t]he act of 
transferring something to another's care or possession, esp. by deed or will; the relinquishing of 
property." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (Westlaw). Merriam-Webster's defines 
"disposition" as, in relevant part, "the act or the power of disposing or the state of being 
disposed." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 335 (lOth ed. 1999). In common parlance, 
therefore, the difference between "disposal" and "disposition" appears de minimis, if not non-
existent. The Association, following the district court's lead, simply declines to come to grips 
with the issue. Priest Lake Br. at 20 ("[t]he sentence using the term 'or other disposition' ... 
refers solely to the extraneous issue of not giving preference to squatters and homesteaders on 
endowment lands"). 
7 The Association asserts that "[t]he cottage site lessees at Priest Lake are limited grants to the 
lessee to make certain improvements without full benefit and use of the property, with limited 
access, and only upon such portion of the property as the Department of Lands may dictate that 
improvements may be made." Priest Lake Br. at 22. This imprecise, if not misleading, summary 
of the lease's terms is belied by a review of the representative 2001-2010 lease in the record 
appended to the affidavit of Bert A. Belles. R Vol. IV, p. 640. Such a review reveals a garden-
variety residential rental agreement that has been tailored to accommodate the construction of 
improvements by the lessee. So, for example, the Land Board has rented to Mr. Belles and his 
spouse a specific parcel of land-T60N, R4W, Section 26, Lot 80-A in Govt. Lot 1, Bonner 
County-for residential use. The lease defines the term "leased premises" or "residence site" in 
section A.l.l.f as "[a] particularly described parcel of state endowment land owned by the State 
of Idaho in fee simple and which has been made available to private individuals through a lease 
for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a residence." Id, p. 641. The rent is determined 
with reference to the "current fee simple value ofthe leased premises, as determined by valuation 
administered by the LESSOR or by valuation as determined by the [county] assessor"-an 
amount that includes the improvements' value. Id, p. 642 (§ D.1.l). The lease further requires 
the lessee to obtain homeowner's insurance or at least its equivalent, together with umbrella 
liability insurance if necessary, to provide a combined limit of not less than $500,000. Id, p. 649 
(§ M.l.l). The insurance provides substantial protection to the lessee and, insofar as it may 
12 
B. The Lessees' reliance on dictionary meanings additionally proves too much. In 
Idaho, as elsewhere, the rental or leasing of real property involves the "disposal" of a quite 
significant, indeed perhaps the most important, "stick of the bundle" (Payette Lake Bf. at 13)--
the right to possession. E.g., Thompson v. Ebbert, 144 Idaho 315, 318, 160 P.3d 754, 757 (2007) 
('" [i]t is the settled law of this state that a lease of real property is a conveyance or encumbrance 
of real estate"') (quoting Intermountain Realty Co. v. Allen, 60 Idaho 228, 229, 90 P.2d 704, 705 
(1939»; Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984) ("[u]nder a lease of 
real property, the lessee has the possessory interest and the lessor has the reversionary interest"); 
Krasselt v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124, 125,578 P.2d 240, 241 (1978) ("A lease is a particular kind of 
contract wherein (generally) a leasehold interest in realty is given in return for a promise to pay 
rent periodically .... The lessee has both contract rights and a limited ownership interest in the 
real property.") (citation omitted); see generally Restatement (Second) of Property: Landlord 
and Tenant § 1.2 (1977) (Reporter's Note) ("[t]he recognition in this section that the right to 
possession must be transferred to create the landlord-tenant relationship is undoubtedly accepted 
dogma in this field of the law"). 
The Lessees, in short, do nothing more than draw a line in the textual sand between some 
avoid long-term substantial diminution of assessed valuation, to the State in the event of covered 
losses to the improvements. Improvements are treated most fully in section K, entitled 
"CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENTS" (emphasis removed). Id, pp. 647-49. The lessee 
has a right to possession of the leased premises until the agreement's termination or expiration, 
with appropriate provisions made for the disposition, including purchase by a new lessee, of any 
improvements. See id., p. 652 (§ R.l.l). Any suggestion that the Priest Lake cottage-sites are 
not subject to a residential leasing arrangement therefore runs headlong into the terms of the 
lease itself. 
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"disposals" and other "disposals." They simply assert that the term can only capture instances 
where the entire "fee" is conveyed. That assertion, however, cannot be squared with the 
carefully framed language in Article IX, Section 8-which uses the term "sale" when it means 
only sales--or the very purpose of the constitutional provision-which is to ensure that, at the 
least, the sale and rental of endowment lands are carried out in a manner calculated to generate 
the maximum long term financial return to the beneficiaries. The public auction requirement is 
an integral component of the constitutionally prescribed process to achieve that purpose. 
III. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO RENDER COMPATABLE WITH THEIR 
PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF "DISPOSAL" THIS COURT'S PRIOR 
DECISIONS MERELY UNDERSCORE THAT ENDOWMENT LAND LEASING 
IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC AUCTION REQUIREMENT 
The Payette Lake Lessees make two points concerning decisional authority that they 
believe is, or is not, relevant to the scope of the term "disposal." They focus initially on three 
cases-Rogers v. Hawley, 19 Idaho 751, 115 P. 687 (1911); Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Reservoir 
Co., 27 Idaho 695, 151 P. 998 (1915); and Allen v. Smylie, 92 Idaho 846, 452 P.2d 343 (1969)-
and argue that these decisions support the proposition that the public auction requirement does 
not apply to the cottage site endowment lands. Payette Lake Br. at 13-15. They then address 
East Side Blaine County and the IWP quartet and contend that those decisions are inapposite 
"because they were decided on statutory grounds-and not constitutional grounds." Id at 15. 
Neither point has merit. 
A. 1. Rogers considered "the question alone of the power and authority of the 
land board to exchange the right, title, or interest of the state in and to unsurveyed school 
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sections for a like area of surveyed and segregated land" pursuant to a then-recently enacted 
statute. 19 Idaho at 756, 115 P. at 689. Although the parties "direct[ed] arguments to the 
question touching the character of title the state acquired to sections 16 and 36 under the 
provisions of the Idaho admission bill[,]" this Court did not deem it "necessary or important" to 
resolve that issue: 
Whether it be a title, absolute and indefeasible, or a mere inchoate right or "floating 
equity," will make no difference with the conclusion we reach in this case, for the 
reason that the case does not involve a mere naked relinquishment of the state's right 
and interest, but it rather involves an exchange of unsurveyed, unidentified, school 
sections for "lands equivalent in area and value" to the sections in lieu of which the 
surveyed lands are taken. 
19 Idaho at 758, 151 P. at 689. This equivalency of value, in the Court's view, negated any 
claim that the exchange violated Article IX, Section 8: 
This statute certainly does not authorize or direct a sale of unsurveyed sections 
16 and 36, and is not therefore obnoxious to the Constitution on the ground that it 
authorizes a sale of school lands for less than $10 per acre, or that it authorizes a 
"disposal" of state lands in a manner, other than "at public auction." It does not 
authorize the unqualified surrender or giving away state lands, for the reason that it 
requires the board to secure title to "lands equivalent in area and value in legal 
subdivisions," etc., as a condition precedent to a complete surrender of the state's title 
and interest in and to the unsurveyed section so released. This statute does not 
authorize the relinquishment of a school section without the state receiving an 
equivalent therefor in the same kind of property, namely, lands equal in area and value 
to those released. After the transaction is complete, the state will have a fee-simple title 
to surveyed lands equivalent in area and value to the unsurveyed lands exchanged 
therefor. The state will still have the same amount of land that it had in the first place, 
and it will be surveyed and identified. 
19 Idaho at 760, 151 P. at 690. The Court distinguished Balderston-which had been decided 
less than 16 months earlier and invalidated the Land Board's uncompensated relinquishment of 
surveyed lands to settlers--on the ground that the issue before it was "a very different question 
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from what it would be, if the relinquishment were without consideration and amounted to an 
unqualified 'disposal' or alienation of the lands relinquished or released." 19 Idaho at 761, 
151 P. at 691. Consequently, "[a]s the law now stands, it is no longer a question of legal 
authority on the part of the board to make these relinquishments in exchange for surveyed lands 
equivalent in area and value to those relinquished in exchange therefor." 19 Idaho at 764, 151 P. 
at 692. 
The Lessees construe Rogers to stand for the proposition that the land exchange statute 
did not run afoul of the public auction requirement "because the exchange did not constitute an 
unqualified surrender or giving away of state lands." Payette Lake Br. at 13. In so arguing, they 
ignore this Court's subsequent decision in Newton v. State Board, 37 Idaho 58, 219 P. 1053 
(1923). There, the land proposed for exchange had been surveyed, and this Court therefore 
framed the issue to a "single question": "Has the state board of land commissioners authority to 
relinquish surveyed sections 16 and 36, granted by the United States to the state by the Idaho 
Admission Bill for school purposes, for other unappropriated surveyed government lands?" It 
answered this question in the negative and explicitly limited Rogers to its particular facts-i. e., 
the transfer by the Land Board of unsurveyed lands. 37 Idaho at 66, 219 P. at 1055-56 ("the sole 
question in Rogers v. Hawley with regard to the power of the state land board to relinquish title 
to any of the state school lands was limited to unsurveyed lands, to which title had not vested in 
the state according to what appears to be the holding of the federal Supreme Court in construing 
grants similar to that contained in the Idaho Admission Bill"). The constitutional provision 
consequently did apply in Newton because the lands-like the cottage sites-had been surveyed, 
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and the Board lacked authority to make the exchange without compliance with that provision. 37 
Idaho at 72, 219 P. at 1058 ("[t]his court is bound by the plain provisions of this constitutional 
provision, which clearly and unmistakably prohibits such an exchange"). The Lessees' failure to 
discuss Newton's impact is inexplicable because this Court made clear that lands exchanged in 
the Rogers controversy were not endowment lands subject to Article IX, Section 8. 
2. This Court's opinions in Tobey v. Bridgewood, 22 Idaho 566, 127 P. 178 
(1912), and Idaho-Iowa Lateral were discussed at some length in the Attorney General's opening 
brief. Appellant Lawrence G. Wasden's Opening Br. ("Attorney General's Br.") at 27-31. The 
Payette Lake Lessees argue that his analysis of the latter decision "relies heavily on the 
concurring opinion of Justice Morgan and the dissenting opinion of Justice Budge, but 
completely disregards the actual holding of the case" that they characterize to be that "the public 
auction provisions ... are applicable when the state parts with the fee, and not where it grants an 
easement." Payette Lake Br. at 14. Notwithstanding the Lessees' broad-brush assertion, the 
Attorney General understands those decisions to be wholly consistent except as to one issue: 
Whether a fee interest was granted under the involved statute now codified at Idaho Code § 58-
601. 
Tobey, according to Chief Justice Sullivan in Idaho-Iowa Lateral, "proceeded on the 
theory that the fee-simple title was taken or disposed of' under the statute, but the Chief Justice 
held that the statute, as an exercise of Article I, Section 14 authority, provided "only a temporary 
use, and the title in fee to the land remains in the state." 27 Idaho at 709, 151 P. at 1002. Idaho-
Iowa Lateral thus did not modify the analysis in Tobey concerning Article IX, Section 8-as the 
17 
concurring opinion of Justice Morgan indicates. 27 Idaho at 709, 151 P. at 1002 (the statute 
"provides only for taking an easement or right of way upon or across school lands" and not "the 
sale or leasing of such lands" subject to Article IX, Section 8). Justice Budge in dissent differed 
from the other Justices principally with respect to the conclusion that § 58-601' s predecessor 
codification granted an easement as opposed to a fee title. 27 Idaho at 720, 151 P. at 1006. In 
sum, Idaho-Iowa Lateral established only that where a statute embodies the exercise of the 
Legislature'S eminent domain powers under Article I, Section 14, with respect to state land, only 
a "temporary use" right is transferred and modified Tobey only to the extent that it construed the 
eminent domain constitutional provision to authorize transfer of the State's fee title.8 
3. The Payette Lake Lessees' suggestion that Allen counsels against the 
8 The Priest Lake Association's analysis of Idaho-Iowa Lateral similarly reveals a basic 
misunderstanding of the decision. It argues that this Court held there "that the granting of an 
easement across state endowment land was not a transaction subject to the public auction 
provisions of the Idaho Constitution because title in tee to the land remained in the state." Priest 
Lake Br. at 21 (emphasis in original). The Chief Justice's opinion merely held that, when 
exercising its eminent domain authority under Article I, Section 14 where endowment lands are 
involved, the Legislature grants only a "temporary use." Justice Morgan concurred on a different 
rationale-i. e., the use right granted to the plaintiff was not a sale or rental-and Justice Budge 
disputed the proposition that the Legislature had intended to exercise its eminent domain 
authority under the relevant statute and that, in any event, only a temporary use was granted. 
Consequently, while the common area of agreement between the Chief Justice's opinion and 
Justice Morgan's concurrence was Article IX, Section 8's inapplicability, they disagreed as to 
the reason for the inapplicability. Even the Chief Justice, however, did not rest his holding on 
the notion that "title to the land remained in the state[;]" he reasoned instead that the statute 
embodied use of the eminent domain power and reconciled Article I, Section 14 with Article IX, 
Section 8 by determining that only a temporary use right was granted. Although his opinion did 
not address the question whether the Legislature could mandate the rental of endowment lands 
outside the eminent domain context-the situation here-without compliance with the public 
auction requirement, it did not modifY Tobey with respect to the requirements imposed under 
Article IX, Section 8. Justice Morgan's concurrence and Justice Budge's dissent answered that 
question in the negative. 
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construction of "disposal" given by the Idaho Supreme Court in the decisions discussed above 
does not further their position. Payette Lake Br. at 14-15. Allen involved mineral leases, and 
none of the parties there raised the issue of the public auction requirement in Article IX, 
Section 8. The plaintiff thus limited his challenge to the validity of the existing lease to a claim 
"that there has been no application under oath by the prior lessee[] and that therefore the 
pretended leases were invalid." 92 Idaho at 849, 452 P.2d at 346. The Lessees accordingly 
argue in effect that this Court resolved sub silentio all other possible challenges to the mineral 
lease's validity. The Court, however, has held repeatedly that it "does not consider issues not 
supported by argument or authority." Cowan v. Bd of County Comm'rs, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 
148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006); see also Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 
1, 18 (2000) ("[t]his Court does not normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority 
sub silentio"). Allen, in short, sheds no light on the meaning of the term "disposal." 
B. Respondents' core thesis about East Side Blaine County and the IWP quartet is 
that this Court predicated its holdings with respect to the necessity of public auction on statutory, 
not constitutional, grounds. E.g. Payette Lake Br. at 15 ("[t]he Attorney General has improperly 
construed the Idaho Watershed [sic] cases because they were decided on statutory grounds-and 
not constitutional grounds"); id at 17 ("[t]he Court's analysis [in East Side Blaine County] 
repeatedly refers to the statutory basis for the conflict auction requirement") (emphasis in 
original); Priest Lake Br. at 17 ("the Court has never determined, nor should it, that the 
Constitution requires an auction of a leasehold interest in order to achieve the maximum long-
term financial return"). As discussed in the Attorney General's Br. at 23-26,31, their reading of 
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the five decisions cannot be squared with this Court's language or accompanying analysis. 
Short excerpts from or summaries of the decisions amply demonstrate the inconsistency 
between what this Court stated and how the Lessees and the Association portray the cases: 
• East Side Blaine County: "The dominant purpose of these provisions of the 
Constitution and of the statutes enacted thereunder is that the state shall receive the greatest 
possible amount for the lease of school lands for the benefit of school funds, and for this reason 
competitive bidding is made mandatory." 34 Idaho at 814, 198 P.2d at 763. 
• IWP I: This Court further "agree [ d]" with the contention "that the Board violated 
article IX, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution by leasing the 640 acres of state public land 
without requiring a competitive bid for the lease of the state public land." 128 Idaho at 764, 
918 P.2d at 1209. It thus held that "[t]he Board does not have the discretion to grant a lease to an 
applicant who does not place a bid at an auction, based upon Idaho's constitutional and statutory 
mandate that the Board conduct an auction." 128 Idaho at 766, 918 P.2d at 1211. 
• IWP II: This Court recognized that the approved constitutional amendment to 
Article IX, Section 8 had as its objective requiring public auctions with respect to "only sales, as 
opposed to leases and sales, of school endowment lands." This statement was made against the 
background of the extensive litigation between IWP and the Land Board over the issuance of 
grazing leases without compliance with the public auction requirement (133 Idaho at 56, 
982 P.2d at 359)-inc1uding IWP I-and implicitly the settled presumption that constitutional or 
statutory amendments '''are usually adopted by the express purpose of making changes in the 
existing system'" (Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 457, 195 P.2d 662, 683 (1948». Simply put, 
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the proponents of the constitutional referendum were dissatisfied with the construction of Article 
IX, Section 8 in IWP I and sought to overrule that construction through the amendment. 
.. IWP III and IV: In invalidating Idaho Code § 58-310B, this Court relied upon the 
phrase "for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said grants of land were made" 
in the third sentence of Article IX, Section 8 and reasoned that the statute impermissibly directed 
the Land Board to consider the interests of the State as well as those of the particular endowment 
land's beneficiaries in its lease decision-making. That phrase modifies the noun "disposal" 
syntactically and is therefore subject to the last antecedent rule. BHC Intermountain Hasp., Inc. 
v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93, 96, 244 P.2d 237, 240 (2010). Because "disposal" status was a 
necessary predicate for IWP's challenge to § 58-310B and because the statute concerned only 
leasing activity, these decisions cannot be reconciled with the construction of "disposal" 
advanced by the Lessees and the Association. Indeed, they offer no textual basis for a different 
conclusion.9 
9 The Lessees attempt to distinguish IWP III and IV on the basis that "the exemption of cottage 
site leases from conflict auctions is not only consistent with constitutional language but also 
increases returns to the Beneficiaries by reducing the risks to the state." Payette Lake Bf. at 18. 
As discussed above, an exemption from the conflict auction requirement in § 58-310 is not 
"consistent with constitutional language," while the possibility that use of § 58-31OA may result 
in an income stream approximating or even exceeding the amount generated from public 
auctions does not eliminate the categorical requirement imposed under Article IX, Section 8. 
The Lessees reprise this argument later in their brief when they state that "[i]t is counterintuitive 
that the Land Board's ability to ensure maximum long-term returns will actually be improved by 
restricting the options it has to manage state lands." Payette Lake Bf. at 25 (emphasis in 
original). Article IX, Section 8 unambiguously subjects all "disposal[s]" to the public auction 
requirement and thus displaces legislative authority to act otherwise-regardless of whether a 
better policy choice might have been made by the Framers. It is therefore impossible to construe 
the constitutionally-imposed public auction directive "harmoniously" (Payette Lake Bf. at 24) 
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The East Side Blaine County and IWP decisions, taken together, leave no doubt about the 
inclusion of endowment land rental within the scope of the term "disposal." Any suggestion that 
their holdings were predicated exclusively on statutory grounds ignores what this Court stated 
and, particularly as to IWP III and IV, the manner in which it construed the clause modifying 
"disposal." Respondents' singularly unpersuasive arguments do little more than highlight the 
implausibility of a different conclusion. 10 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DELIBERATIONS RELIED UPON 
BY RESPONDENTS SAY NOTHING RELEVANT ABOUT THE TERM 
"DISPOSAL" 
A. The Payette Lake Lessees cite to Professor Colson's treatise, Idaho's 
Constitution: The Tie That Binds (2003), and its analysis of the Constitutional Convention's 
debate over Section 4 of Article IX as supporting the proposition that the Framers did not intend 
to "restrain [endowment land] management to the use of a single mechanism." Payette Lake Br. 
at 21. The Priest Lake Association takes a somewhat different tack and quotes statements made 
with § 58-310A-a statute that expressly substitutes the Board's determination of "market rent" 
for the requisite auction in subsection (3). 
10 The Lessees and the Association commend the deputy attorney general's 1990 analysis and 
criticize the 2009 Attorney General's Opinion drafted by the same individual. Payette Lake Br. 
at 27 ("[i]n stark contrast to his 1990 legal opinion, Deputy Strack's 2009 Opinion is a piece of 
advocacy that does not even attempt to create the appearance of an unbiased interpretation of 
Idaho Code § 58-31OA"); Priest Lake Br. at 10 ("Idaho Code § 58-31OA is clearly susceptible to 
valid constitutional interpretation as evidenced by the Attorney General's own informal opinion 
before its most recent 'about-face'''). As discussed in the Attorney General's opening brief, 
however, the intervening, unanimous IWP opinions-all of which rejected the positions 
advanced by the then-Attorney General-removed any arguable doubt about the scope of the 
term "disposal" that may have existed in 1990 and that provided a basis for the conclusion 
reached in the 1990 guideline. See Attorney General's Br. at 26 n.12. The IWP quartet, in other 
words, left no room for applying the presumption in favor a statute's constitutionality to save 
§ 58-310A. 
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by Delegates Claggett and Gray at different parts of the debate over Section 8 that, it contends, 
reflect "[t]he sentiment of these delegates ... that the Legislature should be granted wide latitude 
of discretion in its handling of the disposition of endowment lands in order to meet ever 
changing and unpredictable conditions." Priest Lake Br. at 24. Neither the Lessees nor the 
Association responds substantively to the Attorney General's analysis of the various 
amendments, or defeated amendments, that preceded final adoption of Section 8. The Lessees 
instead dismiss out of hand that analysis because it "fixates on a minute subsection and closing 
remarks, and then uses them as definitive evidence of the Framers' entire intent." Payette Lake 
Br. at 23. 
No question exists that the Constitutional Convention delegates had strong and differing 
views over whether endowment lands should be subject to sale. See Attorney General's Br. 
at 32. No question also exists that the Convention eventually authorized sales in Section 8 or 
that, in so providing, it effectively augmented legislative and Land Board authority to manage 
endowment lands. Nonetheless, Section 8 did not provide the Legislature or the Board a tabula 
rasa upon which to write as they deemed appropriate. It restricted endowment land management 
authority in significant ways, including: (1) requiring "the location, protection, sale and rental" 
of lands granted to Idaho by the United States "in such manner as will secure the maximum long 
term financial return to the institution to which granted[;]" (2) prohibiting post-survey grant of 
"any privileges to persons who may have settled upon [surveyed public] lands ... by which the 
amount to be derived by the sale, or other disposition of such lands, shall be diminished, directly 
or indirectly[;]" (3) requiring "the general grant of lands made by congress to the state ... be 
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judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction 
for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said grants were made[;]" and 
(4) limiting the sale of school lands to 25 sections annually in subdivisions not to exceed 160 
acres to anyone individual, company or corporation. The issue here concerns one of those 
restrictions and cannot be resolved by reference to the general debate at the Constitutional 
Convention over whether to permit the sale of endowment lands or, as the Lessees would have it, 
"private trust law." Payette Lake Br. at 21.11 
B. The Payette Lake Lessees offer as support for the understanding of the Framers' 
intent a provision in an act reported at 1893 Idaho Session Laws 141. Section 14 of the statute 
read: 
If two or more persons desire to lease the same tract of land the county treasurer shall, 
after at least five days notice to all parties who have made application to lease the same 
tract, auction off, at public auction to the person who, in addition to the ten per cent. on 
the appraised value will pay the highest premium for the said lease. 
Id at 145. The previous section established the ten percent rental rate. See id. at 144-45 ("[a]ll 
land appraised and unsold shall be subject to lease, at an annual rate of ten per centum on the 
II Telling in this respect is the Lessees' reliance on Professor Colson's treatise for the general 
proposition that underlies their argument-i. e., the Constitutional Convention's division over 
whether to allow the sale of endowment lands and the ultimate decision to authorize sales-but 
their disagreement with his 2011 paper concluding that endowment land rentals are "disposals" 
subject to the public auction requirement. Payette Lake Br. at 21 n.9; see Dennis C. Colson, 
Idaho Endowment Land and the Idaho Constitution 10 (2011) ("It is clear from the language of 
Article IX and from The Proceedings and Debates that the delegates were using 'disposal' 
broadly to include leases as well as sales. Section 8 refers to 'disposal' at public auction; the 
language does not say "sale" at public auction."), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/ 
sessioninfo/20 l1/interimlresources0829 _ 0830 _ colson.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). Just as 
tellingly, they make no effort to analyze and refute his arguments. 
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appraIse value thereof'). The 1893 statute thus operated generally comparable manner to 
subsection (1) the current conflict auction statute, § 58-310. The Lessees take from this statute 
the notion that "[h]ad the Framers truly intended that all leases of state endowment lands be 
subject to public auctions, early legislatures would surely have passed a law requiring public 
auctions for all leases." Payette Lake Br. at 23. 
The Lessees draw precisely the wrong conclusion. The existence of a conflict auction 
requirement supports the principle that "disposal" encompasses rental activity. The 1893 
Legislature simply recognized that the purpose of an auction is to give competing bidders the 
opportunity to vie for a particular lease. E.g., Barber Lumber Co. v. Gifford, 25 Idaho 654, 666, 
139 P. 557,561 (1914) ("[a]n auction sale is a sale by public outcry to the highest bidder on the 
spot"). As this Court explained in Hammond v. Alexander, 31 Idaho 791, 177 P. 400 (1918): 
By reason of the provision of the Constitution, above quoted, none of the land in 
question could be sold except at public auction. In an auction, competition is a 
necessary element ... and the bidders fix, by competition, the price at which the offered 
property is sold. Competition is an element of each offer and bid . . . , and while all 
agreements among prospective bidders do not operate to vitiate a sale, if the purpose in 
so agreeing is to stifle competition, and if it causes the property offered to be awarded 
to a bidder, or bidders, for less than would have otherwise been offered, the vendor may 
avoid the sale. 
31 Idaho at 794, 177 P. at 401 (citations omitted); see also Pines Grazing Ass 'n v. Flying Joseph 
Ranch, LLC, 151 Idaho 924, 927-28, 265 P.3d 1136, 1139-40 (2010) (oral agreement not to bid 
void). Where only one person has made timely application for a lease and thus would be the 
only person eligible to participate in an auction, competitive bidding cannot occur. No purpose 
is served-and resources are wasted-in carrying out a mere formality. What the 1893 statute 
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does make clear is that a public auction was required where the requisite competition existed. 12 
CONCLUSION 
Idaho Code § 58-310A violates the public auction requirement in Article IX, Section 8 of 
the Idaho Constitution and is invalid in its entirety. The judgment of the district court in Wasden 
should be reversed. 
DATED this 7th day of March 2012. 
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12 The Payette Lake Lessees also point to various statutes that exclude certain form of leases-
commercial leases, state-owned submerged lands leases, mineral leases and geothermal leases-
from an auction requirement either completely or under certain circumstances. Payette Lake Bf. 
at 23-24. Whether any or all of those statutes run afoul of the public auction directive in Article 
IX, Section 8 is an issue that falls outside the scope of this litigation. That the Legislature may 
have enacted other laws violating the auction requirement in statutes other than § 58-310A is 
simply immaterial here. 
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